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The Meta-Constitution: Amendment, Recognition, and the Continuing Puzzle of Supreme 
Law in Canada. 
Sarah E. Hamill 
1. Introduction 
It is a truism that there is more to constitutional law than the written text.  Yet it is not always 
clear how the unwritten and written parts of a constitution interact and this can be particularly 
confusing when the written text entrenches the constitution.  By entrench, I mean that there is a 
higher procedural threshold of amendment for the constitution than for an ordinary statute.   
Typically, constitutional texts emerge against the background of an unwritten tradition, as is the 
case with many Commonwealth nations.  These nations inherited the Westminster system but 
several also have a constitutional text claiming some degree of entrenchment.1  Yet, where the 
constitution is entrenched, its wording could unwittingly entrench matters that were previously 
part of the unwritten constitution. For example, the entrenchment of a particular text clearly 
includes the rules of the text itself but it might also include informal rules which relate to the 
same subject matter as the rules in the text.  In other words, it is possible for the entrenchment of 
a particular text to also entrench other rules surrounding particular subject matters thus making 
constitutional change significantly more challenging than the constitutional framers intended.  
                                                 
 Please note that this is the accepted version of a paper forthcoming in the Oxford University Commonwealth Law 
Journal and is subject to minor changes etc. 
 The author would like to thank Ken Dickerson for many discussions about this topic and for his helpful comments 
and suggestions on earlier drafts, and Bruce Ryder for reading an earlier draft and providing encouragement.  
Thanks are also owed to the anonymous peer reviewers for their feedback and suggestions.   
1 For example, the Constitutions of Australia, Canada, and India, impose a higher threshold on constitutional 
amendments in their respective countries, Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vic, c 12, s 
128; Constitution of India, art 368; Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, 
c11, Part V [Constitution Act, 1982]. 
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Given the scope of constitutional law in a Westminster-style system and the recent push for a 
new constitutional settlement in the United Kingdom, which may involve a written constitution,2 
it is worth paying attention to how the written texts could interact with the unwritten portions of 
the constitution.   
In order to explore these issues I rely on the example of Canada and on the concept of the 
meta-constitution.  The meta-constitution is simply that part or parts of a written constitution 
which is self-referential.3 The meta-constitution should not be confused with the meta-textual 
rules which courts use to interpret written constitutions; the meta-constitution is part of the 
constitutional text and it tells readers what makes up the constitution and how the constitution 
can be altered.4  For many written constitutions the meta-constitution is simple because the 
constitution is usually a single document which can only be amended by one or two procedures. 5 
Canada’s meta-constitution, much like its Constitution, is far from simple and this is why Canada 
is a good case study of the role and importance of the meta-constitution.   
Canada’s Constitution is not contained within a single document; in fact, the Constitution 
of Canada has long been understood to encompass more than simply the written texts.6  At best, 
what Canada has is a partially written constitution,7 though it is not always entirely clear how the 
                                                 
2 Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, The future of devolution after the Scottish referendum (HC2008-
09, 700) 6, available online : http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmpolcon/700/700.pdf  
3 I do not rule out the possibility that a meta-constitution could exist in states with unwritten constitutions but for 
ease of analysis I focus only on written constitutions here. 
4 I say altered here as, in Canada, the meaning of amend has not always been clear. 
5 For a comparison of methods of constitutional amendment and their difficulty, see e.g. Donald S Lutz, Principles 
of Constitutional Design (CUP 2006) 171-182. See also Richard Albert, ‘The Difficulty of Constitutional 
Amendment in Canada’ (2015) 53:1 Alberta Law Review 85, 89-96. 
6 See WPM Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada, 1534-1937: An Introduction to its Development, Law and 
Custom (2nd edn, OUP 1938) 378. 
7 This may well be the case in other countries as well, see e.g. Benjamin L Berger, ‘White Fire: Structural 
Indeterminacy, Constitutional Design, and the Constitution Behind the Text’ (2008) 3:1 Journal of Comparative 
Law 249, 250-252. 
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unwritten and written parts interact; in fact, it is not even clear how the two main texts of the 
constitution are to be reconciled.  Of course, the interaction between the two parts is then further 
complicated by the fact that it is hard to figure out what combination of written instruments and 
unwritten practices make up the Constitution of Canada. The two main texts of the constitution 
are not particularly helpful, and gesture to both a list of constitutional instruments,8 and a list of 
constitutional features.9 In addition to this confusion over what exactly the Constitution of 
Canada is, Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982 offers multiple amending formulae, and figuring 
out which formula is applicable is not always straightforward.10  As such, in the Canadian 
context, there is room for dispute over the meta-constitution and this affords an opportunity to 
see how questions about the scope and flexibility of a constitution play out in court.   
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada issued its decisions in two high-profile reference 
questions dealing with the finer points of the Canadian Constitution.  The first of these 2014 
questions was about the eligibility of Marc Nadon for one of the vacant Quebec seats on the 
Supreme Court of Canada;11 while the second was about the potential for Senate reform. 12  At 
issue in both of these questions was how the Constitution of Canada could be amended.  
Although reference questions are not legally binding, given that they are a species of advisory 
opinion, they have always been followed.13  The federal government lost the argument in both 
                                                 
8 Constitution Act, 1982, (n 1), s52(2)(b). 
9 ibid, ss 41, 42.   
10 Robert E Hawkins, ‘Constitutional Workarounds: Senate Reform and Other Examples’ (2011) 89 Canadian Bar 
Review 513, 514. 
11 Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21 (Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)) [Supreme Court 
Reference]. 
12 Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32 [Senate Reference]. The Quebec government posed its own reference 
question on the matter, Reference re Bill C-7 Concerning the Reform of the Senate, 2013 QCCA 1807 (Quebec 
Court of Appeal) 
13 Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 53 [Supreme Court Act]. See also, John McEvoy, ‘Separation of Powers 
and the Reference Power: Is There a Right to Refuse’ (1988) 10 Supreme Court Law Review 429. 
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decisions, and, as a result, both have begun to attract ample scholarly attention, though they are 
rarely, as yet, examined together.14  
In this paper I want to focus on what these decisions have to say about constitutional 
amendment and recognition in Canada.  By constitutional recognition, I simply mean how to 
figure out what is and is not part of the Constitution of Canada.  As will become clear, there is a 
persistent recognition issue with the Constitution of Canada, which comes to the fore in debates 
about how to amend it.  In Canada, the uncertainty surrounding the meta-constitution gives the 
Supreme Court a wide degree of latitude to determine what is and is not part of the constitution 
and, by extension, what is and is not constitutional.15  As I argue in this paper, in the Supreme 
Court Reference and the Senate Reference, the Supreme Court uses the meta-constitution to 
identify constitutional topics rather than discrete constitutional rules.  The idea of constitutional 
topics is perhaps the next logical step in Canadian constitutional theory, building as it does on 
the previous jurisprudence of constitutional conventions and constitutional principles.  Yet it is 
                                                 
14 For some early commentary see Ian Peach, ‘Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6 – Expanding the 
Constitution of Canada’ (2014) 23:3 Constitutional Forum constitutionnel  1; Adam M Dodek, ‘Uncovering the 
Wall Surrounding the Castle of the Constitution: Judicial Interpretation of Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982’ 
(2105) Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper 13/2015, 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2577818>  accessed 25 April 2016; Kate Glover, ‘Structure, 
Substance and Spirit: Lessons in Constitutional Architecture from the Senate Reform Reference’ (2014) 67 Supreme 
Court Law Review (2d) 221 [Glover, ‘Structure, Substance’]; Hugo Cyr, ‘The Bungling of Justice Nadon’s 
Appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada’ (2014) 67 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 73; Emmett Macfarlane, 
‘Unsteady Architecture: Ambiguity, the Senate Reference, and the Future of Constitutional Amendment in Canada’ 
(2015) 60:4 McGill Law Journal 883; Adam Dodek, ‘The Politics of the Senate Reform Reference: Fidelity, 
Frustration, and Federal Unilateralism’ (2015) 60:4 McGill Law Journal 623 [Dodek, ‘Politics’]; Kate Glover, ‘The 
Supreme Court in a Pluralistic World: Four Readings of a Reference’ (2015) 60:4 McGill Law Journal 839 [Glover, 
‘Four Readings’]; Yasmin Dawood, ‘The Senate Reference: Constitutional Change and Democracy’ (2015) 60:4 
McGill Law Journal 737; Noura Karazivan, ‘De la structure constitutionelle dans le Renvoi relative au Sénat: vers 
une gestalt constitutionelle’ (2015) 60:4 McGill Law Journal 793; Catherine Mathieu and Patrick Taillon, ‘Le 
fédéralisme comme principe matricial dans l’interprétation de la procedure de modification constitutionelle’ (2016) 
60:4 McGill Law Journal 763.  See also David Schneiderman, Red, White, and Kind of Blue: The Conservatives and 
the Americanization of Canadian Constitutional Culture (University of Toronto Press 2015) 176-289. 
15 The term constitutional can have a dual meaning in that it can refer to things which are allowed under the 
constitution – is a law constitutional, for example – but it can also refer to things which are part of the constitution.  
Throughout the paper I try to, as far as possible, use it to mean the former but the context will make it clear when I 
am using it in the latter sense.  Both meanings can occur simultaneously. 
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also clear that the Supreme Court of Canada’s analysis, while being rooted in the constitutional 
texts, also implicitly invokes the original meaning of “the constitution” as being ‘the whole of 
the body politic, including values, norms, behaviours, and institutions.’16 As such, the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s jurisprudence on what the Constitution of Canada is has expanded the scope 
of the constitution and thus what can be considered supreme law in Canada. It also suggests that 
the boundaries of the constitution are questions of political and historical fact to be found by the 
courts, rather than questions of law.  Thus Canada is an example of the ways in which courts can 
guard the constitution from the vagaries of politics in ways which are not always explicit in the 
constitutional text(s). 
I begin with a primarily theoretical discussion of the meta-constitution’s role in written 
constitutions as well as its importance for legal certainty.  In order to explain the meta-
constitution’s importance, I rely on key insights from legal and political theory. It should be 
noted that my argument here is limited to constitutional democracies, particularly those with a 
written or partially written constitution, rather than authoritarian regimes. Then I examine the 
Canada’s meta-constitution with particular reference to the jurisprudence about constitutional 
amendment. This third section is subdivided to explore the pre-1982 case law, the changes 
brought by the Constitution Act, 1982, and the two 2014 reference questions.  As will become 
clear, section 52 offers a tripartite definition which must be read with other parts of the 
constitutional texts, including Part V, in order to be understood.  Yet the Constitution Act, 1982 
was not so much a “new” Constitution as a continuation of what had preceded it,17 including the 
                                                 
16 Berger (n 7) 250 
17 Alan C Cairns, ‘The Politics of Constitutional Conservatism’ in Douglas E Williams (ed) Constitution, 




jurisprudence on what the Constitution of Canada might mean or include.  The Senate Reference 
and Supreme Court Reference are but the latest in this definitional jurisprudence and they 
highlight what happens when the meta-constitution is unclear.  Part four offers a brief discussion 





2. The Meta-Constitution: The Lynchpin of the Law 
In both a theoretical and practical sense a constitution is where the legal and political collide. Not 
surprisingly, constitutions attract ample academic attention because of their legal and political 
importance. Yet of all the aspects of a constitution, the meta-constitution is relatively under-
examined.  In the Canadian context, for example, scholars have commented on the amending 
formula and on the question of what other statutes (or parts of statutes) can be considered to be 
constitutional18 but rarely have they analyzed these two features together or the ways in which 
they might undermine each other.19  This failure seems all the more striking given the importance 
analytical legal theory places on identifying what counts as law. Analytical legal theory’s 
concern with what law is implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, invokes the idea of legal certainty.  
As I show in this section, the meta-constitution is crucial for legal certainty but, in turn, legal 
certainty is important for more political questions such as legitimate authority and the separation 
of powers.  
Written constitutions are, at their heart, a political agreement in a legal form; an 
understanding of how the people it represents are to live together and govern their affairs.  In 
setting out how the country is to be governed, constitutions offer both a framework and a 
boundary for law and politics.  Laws which do not meet the stated criteria fail to be valid laws. 
                                                 
18 Warren J Newman, ‘Living with the Amending Procedures: Prospects for Future Constitutional Reform in 
Canada’ (2007) 37 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 383; ‘Defining the “Constitution of Canada” Since 1982: The 
Scope of the Legislative Powers of Constitutional Amendment Under Sections 44 and 45 of the Constitution Act, 
1982’ (2003) 22 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 423; Stephen A Scott, ‘Pussycat, Pussycat or Patriation and the 
New Constitutional Amendment Process’ (1982) 20:2 University of Western Ontario Law Review 247 [Scott, 
‘Pussycat, Pussycat’]; ‘The Canadian Constitutional Amendment Process’ (1982) 45 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 249 . With respect to the question of which statutes are in the constitution, see Peter W Hogg, 
Constitutional Law of Canada (Carswell 2009) 80-104; Patrick J Monahan and Byron Shaw, Constitutional Law 
(4th ed, Irwin Law 2013) 191-193.  
19 See e.g. the discussion of how section 44 has the potential to undermine certainty, below at fn 161-166.  See also, 
Newman, ‘Defining the “Constitutions of Canada”’ (n 18) 432.  Lutz did not examine Canada’s Constitution in his 
study of constitutional design because he could not determine ‘what has constitutional status’, Lutz (n 5) 179 fn 16. 
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Granted, it is accepted that constitutions will tend towards generalities rather than detailed 
specifics. If the written constitution is to be durable, it must leave room for interpretation and 
certainty will accrue overtime as the amount of constitutional jurisprudence increases.   
Yet the interpretation of written constitutions aims to explain what the constitution 
means, rather than what it is.    In practice these two roles are often blurred, after all meaning and 
being are closely related.  Nonetheless, the role of courts is mainly to interpret rather than 
identify supreme law and for the courts to do this it is important to know what the constitution 
actually is and how, if at all, it may be changed.  These questions are important in a legal sense 
because constitutions tell us which laws are actually laws.  Yet constitutions must also tell us 
whether new or altered constitutional rules are valid, as these changes will result in new criteria 
for the validity of laws. 
Among legal theorists there is longstanding disagreement over how to identify what 
counts as law.  The positivist stance is that the question of identifying law is a purely factual one 
and they rely on a “rule of recognition” to assess whether or not something is law.  At its 
simplest, the positivist stance is that so long as a law is enacted in accordance with the relevant 
legal system’s meta-rule, then it is a valid law.20  Such a stance does not seek to interrogate the 
content of the law, nor does it seek to examine the legitimacy of the law-making power. It does, 
however, implicitly reference the importance of legal certainty. Positivists might argue that 
identifying what law is and is not is important for the purposes of analysis and does not need to 
invoke anything outside of the law such as legitimacy or morality; yet it is not clear that legal 
certainty is a value external to the law.  Other theorists, typically influenced by Lon Fuller, argue 
                                                 
20 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Press 1994) 94-95. 
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that the law has certain internal rules, such as stability, certainty, and non-contradiction,21 which 
work to keep the law coherent as a specifically legal system.22  Fuller’s “internal morality” of the 
law offers space for the content of laws to be assessed as the law must form a system which is 
generally coherent. 
Both the positivist and Fullerian approaches to legal certainty are compatible with how 
constitutions tell us what counts as law; however, in order for a law to be constitutional the 
content of the law as well as its manner of enactment must comply with the constitution.  
Consequently, in a practical sense, if we are to apply the insights of legal theory to constitutional 
democracies, we must be able to identify what the constitution actually is so that we can assess 
whether or not laws purporting to be passed under it are actually valid. 
The meta-constitutional rules which tell us what the constitution is could be described as 
the constitution’s rule of recognition, in that they tells us how to identify what is and is not 
included.  Positivist theory does not explain why it is important to know what the law is outside 
of being able to identify the law.  Perhaps identifying the law is important in and of itself, but in 
a Fullerian sense, the identifying role of the meta-constitution provides the stability, clarity, and 
publicity which are essential components of any legal system.23  These components were 
important for Fuller because he was concerned with how legal systems can promote human 
agency. 24  This concern is largely irrelevant to positivists but it seems particularly appropriate 
for the evaluation of constitutional democracies.25  To the extent that democratic constitutions 
                                                 
21 Lon L Fuller, The Inner Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969), ch 2. 
22 Dan Priel, ‘Lon Fuller’s Political Jurisprudence of Freedom’ (2014) 10:1 Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 18, 
27-28. 
23 Fuller, (n 21) 97. 
24 Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller (Hart Publishing 2012) 2. 
25 By which I mean those democratic countries which have adopted a written constitution as their supreme law. 
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purport to delineate the rights of an individual vis-à-vis the state, they necessarily speak to 
agency in a number of ways.  First, they allow citizens to plan their lives by delineating what 
rights they have and what laws are supreme.  Secondly, through the meta-constitution, they give 
citizens or their representatives the chance to change what the constitution is through peaceful 
means. 
The ability to change the constitution is important in a political sense because of how it 
speaks to consent.  The idea of governance by consent may have come under recent scrutiny,26 
yet there is no doubt that it remains an important legitimating force for democratic states.  The 
ability of citizens to change the rules by which they are governed lends support to the idea that 
consent underpins the political system. This understanding of consent is, of course, more about 
the broader public than the individual, because even a person who does not consent to such 
changes will be bound by them; there is no way to opt out of the state.27  The important points of 
agreement may not be on what the law actually means but on where to find it and how to change 
it.  That is, consent might be more about the process than the result and, if so, this further 
reinforces the need for clarity with respect to how the governing rules are changed 
The ability to change the constitution is important for another reason relating to 
legitimate authority. Questions of legitimacy and the links between political and legal theory are 
often downplayed,28 but in the context of constitutional theorizing they are unavoidable.  As a 
source of legitimate authority constitutions tend to be a mix of legal-rational and traditional 
                                                 
26 See e.g., Jeremy Webber and Colin Macleod (eds) Between Consenting Peoples: Political Community and the 
Meaning of Consent (UBC Press 2010). 
27 See e.g. Christine M Korsgaard, ‘Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution’ in 
Andrew Reath, Barbara Herman and Christine M Korsgaard (eds)  Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for 
John Rawls (CUP 1997) 297. 
28 For a critique of this tendency see, e.g. Dan Priel, ‘The Place of Legitimacy in Legal Theory’ (2011) 57:1 McGill 
Law Journal 1. 
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authority.29  The former is obvious in that legal-rational authority is the form of authority most 
often linked with modern democratic societies.  The link between traditional authority and 
written constitutions is perhaps less obvious; but written constitutions, particularly entrenched 
constitutions, will accrue such authority over time. In addition, such constitutions may also make 
reference to earlier practices and customs, or be incomprehensible without knowing the historical 
contexts.30 Therefore, there is always the risk that a constitution could become too rigid. 
Constitutional amending formula(e) offer one way to ensure that constitutions can evolve 
with the society they represent.  Yet such amending formulae must strike a balance between 
flexibility and stability.  Stability has long been recognized as an important legal value; in fact 
laws which are constantly in flux are of questionable value and may not even be considered valid 
law.31  Stability is also important in a political sense because a state in constant constitutional 
flux suggests a divided populace, which does not and cannot agree on how to live together. Yet, 
stability tacitly invokes traditional authority through its promise to protect some features from 
change. In other words, legal-rational authority can have some traditional aspects to it as well. 
The meta-constitution’s role in ensuring the stability and flexibility of a constitution is 
primarily in delineating what the constitution actually is and having a workable, internally 
coherent way (or ways) to amend the constitution. Without such clarity it will be challenging to 
figure out what counts as supreme law and thus needs to follow the procedures set out in the 
amending formula.  In turn, a lack of clarity complicates constitutional flexibility because it 
would not be obvious if such flexibility was precluded by an alternative piece of legislation. For 
                                                 
29 Here I am referring to Max Weber’s tripartite classification of legitimate authority, see Max Weber, Economy and 
Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (University of California Press 1978) 215. 
30 Berger, (n 7) 250-251. 
31 Fuller, (n 21) ch 2. 
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example, if there was a statute which the constitution has explicitly entrenched as part of the 
constitution, an ordinary statute could not change it.  Yet if the constitution has only implicitly 
entrenched a statute or, parts of a statute, this could lead to confusion over how such a statute 
could be amended.32 The meta-constitution may well be more detailed than other constitutional 
features such as basic rights and division of powers but it does not have to be so.33 
Where the problems start is when the meta-constitution is unclear. A flawed meta-
constitution will not necessarily doom the written constitution as a whole but it does have the 
potential to undermine what the constitution purports to be. Most, if not all, written constitutions 
function as the supreme law of the land, with the courts functioning as interpreters of this law.  If 
a country’s meta-constitution is imprecise or leaves too much room for interpretation, sooner or 
later the courts will struggle to identify what the constitution is which makes it much more 
challenging to assess whether a proposed law is constitutional or not. To some extent, any 
litigation over the meta-constitution threatens to force courts out of their role as interpreters, 
because stating what the meta-constitution means has implications for what the constitution is. In 
this way, the meta-constitution can undermine the separation of powers,34 or at least grant the 
courts the power to expand the scope of the constitution. Fortunately meta-constitutions are for 
the most part uncontroversial but as I now move on to show, Canada’s meta-constitution 
contains contestable criteria instead of clear rules. In turn, this leaves it to the courts to interpret 
and explain which constitutional amendment process certain proposed changes must follow. 
                                                 
32 As was the case with the Supreme Court Act in the Supreme Court Reference, further discussed below, fn 9 to 
122. 
33 See e.g. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vic, c 12, s 128. For a non-Commonwealth 
example see, Constitution of Ireland, art 46. 
34 I leave aside any questions of whether written constitutions might, in general, grant courts more powers than they 
had before.  But on this point see, e.g. John Finnis, ‘Patriation and Patrimony: The Path to the Charter’ (2015) 28:1 




3. The Jurisprudence on Canada’s Meta-Constitution: Substance over Form 
Canada’s constitutional development is well-worn but a brief overview is helpful to survey the 
history of the recognition question.  For ease of analysis, this section is divided into three 
sections: the first covers the pre-patriation Constitution of Canada and the two reference cases 
which helped prompt the Constitution Act, 1982; the second covers the meta-constitution as 
amended by the Constitution Act, 1982, and the subsequent jurisprudence on what the 
‘Constitution of Canada’ is; while the third focuses on the two constitutional reference cases 
decided in early 2014.  Despite this divide, there are two questions running through each of the 
sub-sections: which parts of the Constitution of Canada are not enforceable by the courts and has 
the scope of the enforceable Constitution changed?   Both questions speak to issues with 
Canada’s meta-constitution. 
A. Canada’s meta-constitution before 1982 
The roots of Canada’s Constitution are intertwined with those of the modern British Constitution, 
a fact which should come as no surprise given that Canada used to be a British colony (or, more 
accurately, the original constituent provinces used to be British colonies as did many of the 
provinces which later joined Confederation).35  Britain’s Constitution is, famously, unwritten, or 
mostly unwritten.36  The British Constitution is made up of principles and conventions which 
have evolved over centuries and, while there are rules for identifying conventions and principles, 
the enforcement of conventions is mostly political rather than legal.  In other words, a political 
                                                 
35 Kennedy, (n 6) 378. 
36 An argument could be made that, for example, the Act of Union 1707 is part of Britain’s written constitution. See 
also, Linda Colley, ‘Empires of Writing: Britain, America, and Constitutions, 1776-1848’ (2014) 32:2 Law and 
History Review 237. 
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actor who violates a convention will likely lose political capital rather than face censure in the 
courts.  At times the British Constitution seems to function as more of a gentlemen’s agreement 
than anything else, which is to say there is a rather large amount of trust and expectation that the 
executive, legislature, and judiciary will behave in a certain way and few ways to really enforce 
those expectations.  With this background in mind the reference in the preamble to the 
Constitution Act, 1867 of a ‘Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom’37 
expands Canada’s Constitution beyond the textual provisions and invokes the various norms and 
values implicit in the British Constitution.  As the original Act was renamed (and amended) in 
1982, I use its pre-1982 name, the British North America Act, in this section for clarity.  
The British North America Act was an ordinary Act of the British Parliament even 
though that Act had constitutional status within Canada.  The meta-constitutional aspects of the 
British North America Act left much to be desired. Initially, the Act contained no way for 
Canada to amend it without going through the British Parliament in London.  The federal 
Parliament could, of course, supplement the British North America Act with ordinary, domestic 
statutes, such as the Supreme Court Act.  From 1949 onwards, there was also some scope for 
domestic constitutional amendment but this scope was limited.38  Similarly, the recognition 
aspects of the British North America Act were (and remain) far from clear but, based on 
jurisprudence, the preamble to the Act functioned and continues to function, as a way of 
delineating what the Constitution was and is.39 Initially, however, the preamble invoked the 
unenforceable, political constitution rather than any enforceable constitutional rules.  
                                                 
37 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, preamble,  reprinted in RSC 1985, Appendix II, No 5. 
38 British North America (No. 2) Act, 1949, 13 Geo. VI, c. 81 (UK). Other amendments had to go through 
Westminster. 
39 For pre-1982 discussions see Reference re Authority of Parliament in Relation to the Upper House (1979), [1980] 
1 SCR 54, 69 [Upper House Reference]; For post-1982 discussions see New Brunswick Broadcasting Co v Nova 
15 
 
As a result of the British North America Act, the Canadian Constitution has always been 
more legal than Britain’s.  Consequently, the courts have always had the power to rule Canadian 
legislation ultra vires and to judge certain political actions against the yardstick(s) provided in 
the text of the constitution.  Though there were perhaps some novel aspects to Canadian 
constitutional interpretation, the jurisprudence built on the longstanding traditions of statute 
interpretation and common-law reasoning.40  In a way, the British North America Act appears as 
a work in progress.  After all, the text of the preamble states that it is “expedient” to provide for 
“Legislative Authority ... and the Nature of Executive Government” in the Dominion.  This 
suggests a sense of urgency and the idea that some of the details would be filled in later as, in 
fact, some were. Arguably, the change in 1949 which allowed some domestic amendment to the 
text of the British North America Act was among the most important, being the first step in the 
patriation process. 
By the 1960s it had become clear that Canada needed something of a constitutional 
overhaul.41 A key sticking point was the difficulty in getting all of the provinces and the federal 
government to agree to one package.42 Matters came to a head when the government of Pierre 
Trudeau attempted to force the issue: first, by attempting to unilaterally reform the Senate; and 
second, by attempting to unilaterally patriate the Constitution.  The actions of the Trudeau 
                                                 
Scotia (Speaker of the Assembly), [1993] 1 SCR 319,  374-75 (McLachlin J, as she then was), 100 DLR (4th) 212 
[NB Broadcasting ]; Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 
3 SCR 3, 68-69 [Provincial Court Judges]. 
40 It is beyond the scope of this particular paper to analyse Canada’s entire history of constitutional interpretation.  
For some discussions see Kennedy, (n 6); Hogg, (n 18); Monahan & Shaw, (n 18) 
41 For more on this time period see e.g. Peter H Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a 
Sovereign People? (University of Toronto Press 1992); Roy Romanow, John Whyte and Howard Leeson, 
Canada....Notwithstanding: The Making of the Constitution, 1976-1982 (Carswell 1984). 
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government led to two Supreme Court reference decisions in quick succession, both of which 
explored what exactly was meant by the ‘Constitution of Canada.’43 
The first reference case, the Upper House Reference, saw the Court discuss the limits of 
the section 91(1) amending power, as introduced in 1949.  At issue was whether the federal 
parliament could abolish or reform the Senate and if so, to what extent could it be reformed.  The 
Court held that section 91(1) only allowed the federal parliament to amend the British North 
America Act with respect to matters that only concerned the federal government; they could not 
unilaterally alter the shape of those institutions which the British North America Act set up to 
provide a balance between the federal government and the provinces.44 In this case, to bolster 
their answer about the limits of the federal amending power, the Court examined the original 
intent of the Fathers of Confederation and found that the Senate was an essential feature of the 
original federal bargain. 
The Court also spent some time puzzling over what section 91(1) meant by ‘the 
Constitution of Canada.’  The British North America Act did not define the phrase and it did not 
appear elsewhere in the Act.  The federal government tried to argue that this was a wide-ranging 
amending power but the Court observed that ‘s.91 (1) does not give power to amend the [British 
North America] Act ... [i]nstead, the phrase “Constitution of Canada” is used.’45 Then the Court 
further limited the definition of ‘Constitution of Canada’ to meaning ‘the constitution of the 
federal government’46 because whenever the Act spoke of “Canada” it did so to differentiate the 
                                                 
43 These were not the first cases to discuss what was meant by “Constitution of Canada” but the question had a 
particular kind of urgency in these two cases, which was arguably lacking in the previous cases. For earlier 
discussions see e.g. Jones v New Brunswick (AG), [1975] 2 SCR 182, 196 (Supreme Court of Canada) [Jones]. 
44 Upper House Reference, (n 39) 69-70. 
45 ibid 69. 
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federal from the provincial.47  The fact that section 91(1) was added in 1949, over eighty years 
after the British North America Act came into force, might explain why it is the only place to 
refer to the ‘Constitution of Canada.’  
A little under two years after the Upper House Reference, the Patriation Reference saw a 
majority of the Court find that, while there was no legal impediment to the federal government’s 
power to request an amendment to the constitution without the consent of the provinces, such a 
move would breach a convention requiring a ‘substantial measure’ of provincial consent.48 The 
Patriation Reference again saw the Court discuss what the Constitution of Canada was.  Chief 
Justice Laskin, in dissent to the second question about whether or not there was a constitutional 
convention requiring provincial consent, noted that the Canadian Constitution was ‘only in part 
written’ and took the form of ‘statutes and common law rules which declare the law and have the 
force of law, and ... customs, usages and conventions .... which, while not having the force of law 
.... form a vital part of the constitution.’49 Laskin CJC’s comments arguably opened the door for 
domestic Canadian statutes, including those of the provinces, to be considered part of the 
constitution. In a similar vein, the majority noted that a ‘substantial part of the rules of the 
Canadian constitution are written. They are contained not in a single document called a 
constitution but in a great variety of statutes some of which have been enacted by the Parliament 
at Westminster ... or by the provincial legislatures.’50  The majority agreed that conventions 
formed part of the constitution and that they could not be enforced by the courts.51 With respect 
                                                 
47 Upper House Reference, (n 39) 70. 
48 Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753, 905 (Supreme Court of Canada) [Patriation 
Reference].  With respect to the question of there being a legal impediment, the Court split seven judges to two; 
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49 ibid 852-53. 
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to the conventions included in the constitution, some originated in Canada, while others were 
incorporated via the British North America Act’s preamble. In other words, the majority was 
trying to draw a line between the political parts of the constitution and the legal parts;52  the 
effect of such a distinction being that the courts were only bound to uphold the latter. 
The definition of the Constitution of Canada appears to differ between the Upper House 
Reference and the Patriation Reference.  The former’s definition relied on a narrow textual 
reading of section 91(1), while the latter took a broader approach to the meaning of the term 
“constitution.”  Yet the broader definition of the Constitution of Canada is implicit in the Upper 
House Reference.  The Court’s interpretive footwork in the Upper House Reference worked to 
limit the federal parliament’s power to amend the broader constitution and relied on statutory 
interpretation as well as an examination of what the federal amending power had previously been 
used for.  The Court’s line drawing between “Constitution of Canada” and the British North 
America Act reflects both the actual text of Canada’s Constitution and its unwritten 
commitments.  What the Patriation Reference did was make the broader scope of the 
Constitution of Canada clearer.  
As a result of the Patriation Reference there was a meeting of the Prime Minister and all 
the provincial Premiers in November 1981.  This meeting resulted in the document that would 
become the Constitution Act, 1982 as well as substantial changes to the text of the British North 
America Act.  The Constitution Act, 1982 completed the process set in motion in 1949 and 
provided the much-needed amending formulae which would allow Canada to amend its own 
Constitution without needing any help from the United Kingdom. 
                                                 






B.  The meta-constitution of the Constitution Act, 1982: continued definitional struggles 
The Constitution Act, 1982 did not represent a completely new start for the Canadian 
Constitution.53 What it did represent was a mix of renovation – the changes to the British North 
America Act, now the Constitution Act, 1867, for example – replacement and additions – the 
Charter and the amending formulae, for example. Certain new ambiguities were introduced into 
the written parts of the constitution – such as, the relationship of Part V’s amending formula with 
section 101 in the Constitution Act, 186754 – but that is to be expected with any statute, 
constitutional or otherwise, which does not supersede, at least not entirely, what already exists. 
Among the biggest problems with the introduction of the Constitution Act, 1982 is that it 
resulted in there being two main texts of the constitution, each with their own internal logic, and 
no clear way of reconciling the two.  In particular, how are courts to reconcile the preamble of 
the 1867 Act and its implied, unwritten, British-style constitution with section 52 of the 1982 
Act, which seems to make all parts of the constitution supreme law?  Before moving on to 
examine the post-1982 jurisprudence on defining the Constitution of Canada and its attempts to 
reconcile section 52 and the 1867 preamble, this section examines the new meta-constitution of 
1982. 
i. The New Meta-Constitution of 1982 
The key changes included in 1982 were the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the amending 
formulae. However, the text of what would become the Constitution Act, 1982 went through a 
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number of changes before its final form was patriated in 1982. As such my analysis in this 
section includes the proposed Constitution Act, 1980 which represents the federal government’s 
attempt at unilateral patriation.55 I do not intend to exhaustively document each textual change to 
the meta-constitution but, where relevant, I will highlight where text was changed between 1980 
and 1982, as minor textual changes such as altering the position of certain sections, had 
significant implications for what ultimately became supreme law in 1982. 
Instead of offering a relatively simple method of amendment, the 1982 formulae offered 
several which, as was soon noted, did not necessarily improve upon the pre-1982 situation.56  At 
the November 1981 meeting the amending formula was one of the key issues to be decided,57 
suggesting that all parties recognized their importance.  Canada’s limited ability to amend its 
own constitution had hindered the country’s political independence and placed Canada at the 
mercy of a foreign Parliament. The complexity of Canada’s amending formulae may be a result 
of their development at a much later date,58 but they are also indicative of certain conflicts 
between the provinces, particularly between the English provinces and Quebec.  A key sticking 
point prior to 1982 was how best to protect provincial powers from diminution without 
provincial approval and a range of formulas were developed to try and answer such concerns. At 
the same time, however, the amending formulae received much less attention than the Charter, 
1982’s other main constitutional change.59 
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The formulae, which were eventually agreed upon in 1982, offer five ways for the 
Canadian Constitution to be amended.60  Some parts of the Constitution can be amended by the 
general procedure which requires the approval of two-thirds of the provincial legislatures, that 
together have at least fifty percent of the population (the 7/50 rule), and the approval of the 
federal Parliament; other parts of the constitution require the unanimous agreement of all 
provincial legislatures and the federal Parliament; Parliament can make some constitutional 
amendments by itself, and then there are those amendments which apply to some but not all 
provinces – these require the approval of the federal Parliament and the legislatures of the 
affected province(s).61 It should also be noted that all amendments involving the federal 
Parliament and at least one province, can go ahead without a resolution of the Senate if such a 
resolution is not adopted within 180 days of the House of Commons’ resolution.62  It is tempting 
to view the various methods as reflecting the need to balance provincial interests with national 
unity and as setting out a handful of items which are so central as to need unanimous agreement 
before they can be amended.63  However, section 41 is, or at least was, a reflection of the 
concerns of provincial premiers in the early 1980s.  Its form and content were by no means pre-
ordained, nor did it reflect any over-arching national vision.64  Theoretical coherence can, of 
course come later, and is often created by courts and scholars after the fact. As we shall see, 
some Canadian constitutional scholars have created a theory that only the entrenched parts of the 
constitution are supreme but this theory runs counter to the text.   
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The final form of the amending formulae differed in a few key ways from what the 
federal government had initially proposed in 1980. Although the version suggested in 1980 also 
had a range of amendment procedures, unanimity was not one of them; instead, they offered 
amendment by referendum.65  The 1980 version also explicitly included the Charter in the list of 
items which needed a more rigorous form of amendment such as the general procedure or by 
referendum.66  It was not until November 1981 that amendment by referendum and the 
references to the Charter were removed from the formulae.67  The effect of omitting the Charter 
from either the general amending procedure or the unanimous procedure is that the Charter can 
be and has been amended under section 43,68 but also that it could be amended under section 44.  
The scope of Charter amendment under these two sections would be quite limited and would not 
result in wholesale changes to the Charter.  Section 44 could be used, for example, to alter the 
maximum duration of the House of Commons.69  The bulk of Charter amendments, however, 
would likely fall under the general procedure given that the Charter is clearly part of the 
Constitution of Canada.  The exception here would be any amendment to the Charter’s guarantee 
that citizens can interact with the federal government in English or French as that is covered by 
section 41(c) and requires unanimity. 
In addition to Part V, the Constitution Act, 1982 added section 52 which functions as a 
recognition section and tells us what the Constitution of Canada is.  Section 52 has three things 
to say about the Constitution of Canada: 1) it is the supreme law of Canada;70 2) it includes 
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several other legal instruments;71 3) it can only be amended ‘in accordance with the authority 
contained within the Constitution of Canada.’72  The last part of this tripartite definition 
implicitly calls to mind Part V, but it seems to suggest that there might be other sources of 
amending authority, outside of Part V.73 By itself, then, section 52 is circular and does not help 
with settling disputes about what is and is not part of the constitution. Such disputes can and 
have arisen in a number of contexts. For example, there have been disputes about legislation 
which arguably cannot be valid except as an amendment,74 and, in the case of the Supreme Court 
Reference, about whether government action is contrary to something which may or may not be 
in the constitution.75 
Much like Part V, section 52 changed significantly between the proposed Constitution 
Act, 1980 and the Constitution Act, 1982.  The most striking difference is that in the 1980 
proposal only the Charter was supreme and was protected by section 25 which read: ‘Any law 
that is inconsistent with the provisions of this Charter is, to the extent of such inconsistency, 
inoperative and of no force or effect.’76 The 1980 version also had a definitional section which 
read: 
(1) The Constitution of Canada includes  
(a) the Canada Act;  
(b) the Acts and orders referred to in Schedule I; and  
(c) any amendment to any Act or order referred to in paragraph (a) or (b). 
(2) Amendments to the Constitution of Canada shall be made only in accordance with the 
authority contained in the Constitution of Canada.77 
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By February 13, 1981 the supremacy clause and the definitional section had been rolled into one 
section with supremacy applying to ‘the Constitution of Canada’; the very wording which later 
became section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.78 This change in wording put the Charter on 
equal footing with the rest of the constitutional statutes and removed the potential for the Charter 
to invalidate other statutes which were part of the constitution.  However, as noted, the Charter’s 
ultimate removal from the matters listed in sections 41 and 42, means that Charter amendments 
can occur under sections 38, 41, 43 or 44 depending on the subject matter of the amendment.  In 
addition, this melding of what was previously two separate sections in the 1980 proposal has the 
effect of making all amendments under the unilateral, federal power (now section 44) into 
supreme law.  It is not clear that anyone realized the implications of a three-pronged section 52 
in 1982 and, when read with the open list in section 52, it seems as though supreme status has 
been, or could be, conferred on a range of federal statutes.  
The pre-1982 jurisprudence of the Upper House Reference and the Patriation Reference 
foreshadow the shape that the Constitution Act, 1982 took.   The Upper House Reference seems 
to predict the various thresholds of consent eventually allowed for under Part V.  Part V also sets 
out what the ‘substantial consent’ referred to by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Patriation 
Reference looks like.  The Upper House Reference’s comments about section 91(1) make section 
44 seem like the earlier section’s clear successor. Yet, section 44 poses certain unique issues of 
its own. Namely, the relationship between section 44 and section 52 in the Constitution Act, 
1982 has the potential to create confusion with respect to the Constitution of Canada. Section 44 
allows some parts of the Constitution of Canada to be amended via federal legislation.  It does 
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not, however, require the bill to say that it is an amendment to the constitution.79 Consequently, 
as the constitution is supreme law under section 52 and federal legislative amendments are 
allowed under the authority of section 44, the federal Parliament can make supreme law without 
saying so. Walters argues that any such stealth amendments would make a mockery of a written 
constitution’s claim to supremacy.80 Walters’ point seems intuitively correct, but Canada’s 
Constitution is more than just the written texts and, as 2014 made clear, there is disagreement 
about what is and is not included in the Constitution.  Before moving on to look at the 2014 
decisions, it is necessary to examine what the Supreme Court of Canada had to say about the new 
meta-constitution of 1982. 
ii. The Jurisprudence on the Meta-Constitution, 1982-2013 
Almost immediately the Constitution Act, 1982 faced a legal challenge in the form of the Quebec 
Veto Reference.81  This question centred on whether or not there was a constitutional convention 
granting Quebec a veto over constitutional amendments. In their decision the Court made it clear 
that ‘the new procedure for amending the Constitution of Canada ... entirely replaces the old one 
in its legal as well as in its conventional aspects.’82  In other words, Quebec had lost its veto and 
the new meta-constitution, or at least the amending formulae of the meta-constitution, 
completely replaced the earlier amending procedures.  Yet the patriation of the Constitution of 
                                                 
79 Nor is it necessarily limited to changes to the text of the Constitution, Newman, ‘Defining the “Constitution of 
Canada”’ (n 18) 494-498. 
80 Mark Walters, ‘The Constitutional Form and Reform of the Senate: Thoughts on the Constitutionality of Bill C-7’ 
(2013) 7 Journal of Parliamentary and Political Law 37, 52. 
81 Reference re Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1982] 2 SCR 793 (Supreme Court 
of Canada) [Quebec Veto Reference]. 
82 ibid 806. 
27 
 
Canada did not supersede the pre-1982 jurisprudence.  In fact, the Court continued to rely on this 
jurisprudence to delineate what is (or is not) included in the Constitution of Canada. 
In New Brunswick Broadcasting Co v Nova Scotia (Speaker of the Assembly), the Court 
had to decide whether the Charter applied to Assembly members when they exercised their 
privileges as members. In particular, the case centred on whether the members of the Nova 
Scotia House of Assembly could exclude television cameras from an independent broadcasting 
company.83  A majority of the Court held that the Charter did not apply because the Assembly’s 
privilege was part of the Constitution of Canada and ‘[i]t is a basic rule, not disputed in this case, 
that one part of the Constitution cannot be abrogated or diminished by another part of the 
Constitution.’84  McLachlin J (as she then was) rooted her decision in the preamble to the 
Constitution Act, 1867, ‘historical tradition and the pragmatic principle that the legislatures must 
be presumed to possess such constitutional powers as are necessary for their proper 
functioning.’85 As such, it would seem as though the recognition aspects of the pre-1982 meta- 
constitution, that is the vague reference in the preamble of the 1867 Act to a British-style 
constitution, were not superseded in 1982.  Except that McLachlin J’s reasoning appears to turn 
what was unenforceable prior to 1982 – the unwritten rules of a British-style constitution – into 
enforceable law.  In dissent, Sopinka J found it odd that the framers would have opted to 
entrench certain privileges in the preamble by ‘a general reference.’  He felt that McLachlin J’s 
argument removed the assembly’s control over its own ‘rights and privileges’ meaning that 
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amendments to such rights and privileges could only be achieved by an amendment to the 
Constitution Act, 1982 under section 43 or even section 38.86  
The Provincial Court Judges Reference dealt with the validity of provincial judges’ 
salary cuts.  These salary cuts were perceived as undermining judicial independence and 
impartiality.  In this case, the Court again examined the scope of the constitution.   A majority of 
the Supreme Court held that the written parts of the constitution did not ‘comprise an exhaustive 
and definitive code for the protection of judicial independence.’87  Here the majority’s primary 
concern may have been judicial independence but their reasoning seems equally applicable to 
any constitutional feature, particularly those which are largely unwritten.88  The majority noted 
that section 52(2) suggests that the Constitution of Canada includes unwritten rules and then 
referred to the preamble of 1867 and its ‘organizing principles’ as the source of these unwritten 
rules.89  The reason the majority traced the source of the unwritten rules to the preamble appears 
to have been motivated by the recognition that written constitutions ‘promot[e] legal certainty 
and through it the legitimacy of constitutional judicial review.’90 Here the majority seems 
anxious to avoid falling into the trap of saying what the constitution is rather than what it means; 
in other words, they are attempting to avoid making law, instead of finding it.   In a sense what 
the majority says, and what the Court has said in other cases is: here is what the constitution is 
meant to mean, this is what the Fathers of Confederation thought they were agreeing to.91  Of 
course, the problem here is that, although not directly stated, the majority seems to think that the 
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1982 reforms turned the 1867 preamble into a source of enforceable supreme law.  If so, they did 
not offer any guidance in how to distill enforceable rules from the preamble. 
The following year, the Quebec Secession Reference saw the Governor-in-Council ask 
the Court three questions including whether the Constitution of Canada allowed Quebec to 
secede unilaterally. The Court said that unilateral secession would not be legal but following a 
referendum in support of secession the rest of the country would have a duty to negotiate.  Not 
surprisingly the decision was highly politicized and soon attracted ample academic attention.  
My interest in the decision is not so much the answer to the question but how the question 
prompted the court to expand on their understanding of what the Constitution of Canada is. The 
Court observed that ‘[o]ur Constitution is primarily a written one... Behind the written word is an 
historical lineage stretching back through the ages, which aids in the consideration of the 
underlying constitutional principles.’92  The Court’s reference to ‘an historical lineage’ is at once 
a form of reasoning familiar to common-law lawyers and a suggestion that there is a strong 
cultural aspect to the Canadian Constitution: the constitution cannot be understood simply by 
reading the text, knowledge of both the history and the unspoken commitments which emerge 
from that history are required for a full understanding of the constitution.93 In turn, this respect 
for the historical lineage of Canada’s Constitution suggests that it has a mix of traditional and 
legal-rational legitimacy as opposed to democratic legitimacy.94  What this does is it tilts the 
balance in favour of the courts with respect to constitutional interpretation.  In Canada, this 
deference to the courts as the guardians of constitutional interpretation is then further enhanced 
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by the reference procedure.  Such deference is not, however, helpful in answering the question of 
what effect “constitutional principles” might have. 
Warren Newman argues that the Court treats constitutional principles as binding gap 
fillers in the constitutional text.95 Yet he also argues that these principles do not have the direct 
force of law, they simply have a role to play in applying and understanding the written text.96  
Where these principles become problematic is in trying to figure out what exactly section 52 or 
Part V means or applies to. Newman’s analysis might well suffer from the ‘textual myopia’97 
referred to by Berger but perhaps the Court is trying to reconcile the broader meaning of 
“constitution” with the more modern idea that a “constitution” is simply a document or collection 
of documents.  One way to reconcile these two meanings is to use the text of the written 
constitution to ascertain the shape of the broader constitution, the body politic.  The Supreme 
Court of Canada took that step in the Supreme Court Reference and the Senate Reference, and 
used the meta-constitution to identify the broader shape of the Constitution of Canada. Prior to 
these two references, the main meta-constitutional conundrum was what criteria could be used to 
determine whether or not sources not included in the schedule might be supreme law. As will 
become clear, in resolving that predicament, the Court has introduced another, one which 
threatens to further restrict parliamentary sovereignty by greatly expanding the scope of what 
counts as supreme law and the judiciary’s role in identifying it.98  
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C. The Rise of Constitutional Topics: the Supreme Court Reference and the Senate Reference 
In this section my focus is on the Supreme Court Reference and the Senate Reference; in 
particular, I examine what both had to say about how to figure out what is and is not included in 
the Constitution of Canada and, as a result, what changes must be done in accordance with Part 
V of the Constitution Act, 1982 in order to be valid.  For ease of analysis, I examine each 
reference in turn. 
i. Supreme Court Reference 
In the Supreme Court Reference the Supreme Court had to decide whether section 41(d)’s 
reference to the ‘composition of the Supreme Court of Canada’ includes changes to the 
qualifications of its members.  The reference question emerged out of the federal government’s 
attempt to appoint Marc Nadon to one of the three Quebec seats guaranteed under the Supreme 
Court Act. At the time Nadon was a supernumerary judge of the Federal Court of Appeal but had 
previously been a member of the bar of Quebec for a number of years.99  The legal challenge to 
his appointment centred on how to read sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act and whether 
or not the government could issue declaratory legislation with respect to this Act to make 
Nadon’s appointment valid.100  The Supreme Court split on this matter with the majority ruling 
against Nadon’s appointment while Moldaver J ruled in favour of it. 
The key difference between the majority decision and the dissent was whether or not 
section 6 limited Quebec candidates to current Quebec judges and current Quebec barristers or 
advocates.  The majority said that it did, while Moldaver J said that it did not and both judgments 
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argued that their reading was in keeping with the historical understanding of the eligibility 
requirements of Supreme Court judges.101  Under section 5 of the Supreme Court Act, both 
current and former judges and barristers or advocates of at least ten years standing are eligible 
for appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada.  As Quebec has a different legal system, the 
Supreme Court Act reserves three seats for individuals trained in Quebec Civil Law.  According 
to section 6 of the Supreme Court Act, the candidates for these Quebec judgeships must ‘be 
appointed from among the judges of the Court of Appeal or of the Superior Court of the Province 
of Quebec or from among the advocates of that Province.’102  The government argued that 
sections 5 and 6 must be read together so that both the ten years standing and the reference to 
former members are included in the section 6 eligibility requirements.103  While the majority 
agreed that the two sections must be read together, they held that reading them together does not 
allow former members of the Quebec bar to be appointed under section 6.  The majority read 
section 6 as making “additional specifications” for the three Quebec judges and ‘[o]ne of these is 
that they must currently be a member of the Quebec bar.’104 
Having so ruled, the next question for the majority was whether Parliament could enact 
declaratory legislation about the meaning of section 6 and whether such legislation would change 
‘the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada.’105  The government argued that that the 
eligibility requirements of the Supreme Court had not been ‘entrenched’ in the Constitution and, 
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as such, Parliament had the power to amend the eligibility criteria of the Supreme Court under 
section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867.106  Section 101 reads: 
[t]he Parliament of Canada may, notwithstanding anything in this Act, from Time to 
Time provide for the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of 
Appeal for Canada, and for the Establishment of any additional Courts for the better 
Administration of the Laws of Canada. 
As the majority went on to note, this was as a forward-looking section designed to leave room 
for Canada to establish a general court of appeal.107  No such court existed at Confederation and 
it took the better part of a decade for one to be established given the extent of Quebec’s 
opposition to this court.108  
Due to the idiosyncrasies of Canadian constitutional development, by the time of 
patriation, the Supreme Court of Canada was playing a key constitutional role without being 
explicitly entrenched in the Constitution.  The Constitution Act, 1982 expressly protects the 
composition of the Supreme Court and requires unanimity for any amendments affecting 
composition.  To explain the appearance of the Court in Part V, the government attempted to rely 
on Peter Hogg’s “empty vessels” theory. The majority found such a theory to have ridiculous 
results including inadequate constitutional protection for the Supreme Court.109  In fact, the 
majority stated that at the time of patriation ‘the clear intention was to freeze the status quo in 
relation to the Court’s constitutional role, pending future changes.’110 Crucially, the majority 
cites to the explanatory notes to Part V which describe the section 41 list as being about ‘matters 
...  of fundamental importance.’111  According to the majority, unanimity was the only way to 
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ensure that Quebec’s representation on the Court could not be altered without Quebec’s consent.  
While the government can make routine amendments for ‘the continued maintenance of the 
Supreme Court’, it cannot alter ‘the constitutionally protected features of the Court’ even if such 
features are more implicit than explicit in the constitutional text.112  One wonders if this 
constitutional protection extends to the various conventions of the Supreme Court, such as 
having one judge from the Atlantic Provinces, and two from Western Canada. Such questions 
may be answered at some point in the future, perhaps through another reference question. 
The other effect of the majority’s decision in the Supreme Court Reference is that the 
composition and qualifications of Supreme Court Justices appear to be one and the same.  As 
such, the federal government could not now unilaterally amend the qualifications to require all 
Supreme Court Justices to be bilingual.113 Granted, there is something of a convention to always 
appoint bilingual judges to the Supreme Court but this is not always followed.  Hugo Cyr 
recently argued that the bilingual requirement for Supreme Court appointments is already in the 
constitution and adding an explicit legislative requirement would be merely declaratory.114  He 
roots his argument in the majority’s emphasis that all parts of Canada need to see the Court as 
legitimate.  Perhaps the final determination of the question of bilingualism will take another 
reference question but given that Justice Moldaver was unilingual at the time of his 
appointment,115 any decision holding that bilingualism is in fact required by the constitution 
could provoke some concerns with respect to the decisions which Moldaver J has played a part 
in.  I say concerns as per the Manitoba Language Reference the de facto doctrine would uphold 
                                                 
112 ibid [101]. 
113 Macfarlane (n 14) 901. 
114 Cyr (n 14) 107 
115 Matthew Shoemaker, ‘Bilingualism and Bijuralism at the Supreme Court of Canada’ (2012) Canadian 
Parliamentary Review 30,34. 
36 
 
the decisions made by an imperfectly constituted bench.116 That being said, it is doubtful that 
bilingualism is actually protected by the constitution.117 
Moldaver J’s dissent in the Supreme Court Reference broadly accepted the government’s 
argument about how to read sections 5 and 6 together.  As such he did not feel it useful to answer 
the second question about whether the declaratory legislation proposed by the government would 
amount to a constitutional amendment requiring unanimity.118  He was doubtful that ‘any and all 
changes to the eligibility requirements will necessarily come within ‘the composition of the 
Supreme Court of Canada’ in s.41(d).’119 Moldaver J pointed out that had Parliament intended 
Quebec appointees to be current members, ‘surely it would have said so in clear terms.’120 
The effect of the majority’s decision in the Supreme Court Reference seems to be that 
certain sections of the Supreme Court Act are included in the Constitution.  What this means is 
that the schedule is not an exhaustive list, and does not preclude the possibility that certain 
sections of other acts, passed between 1867 and 1982, might also be part of the Constitution.   
The majority justified their decision on the grounds that the Supreme Court plays a key role in 
Canada’s ‘constitutional architecture.’121  Thus, in order to figure out what other legislative 
provisions might be part of the constitution, we must look to whether or not these provisions 
touch on the constitutional architecture. In fact, the Supreme Court Reference goes further than 
this and makes it clear the constitution does not simply include parts of other statutes but what 
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the court referred to as ‘essential features.’122  As such, figuring out the scope of what is and is 
not constitutionally protected is much more complicated than simply examining the statute book, 
it will require an assessment of the features of institutions and whether these features are 
essential to the role those institutions play in the constitutional structure. 
ii. Senate Reference 
In the Senate Reference the government asked the Supreme Court a series of questions about 
how to make specific changes to the Senate.  In its arguments before the Court, the federal 
government relied on a narrow textual analysis of the Constitution, an approach which was 
unanimously rejected by the Court.  The Court criticized the government’s approach to both 
consultative elections and Senate abolition as privileging ‘form over substance.’123  With respect 
to the former, the government tried to argue that introducing elections would change neither the 
constitutional text nor the ‘formal mechanism for appointing Senators.’124 Regarding Senate 
abolition, the government tried to argue that this could be done under the general procedure 
because abolition would ‘take[] away all of the Senate’s powers and all of its members.’125  The 
government rooted its argument in section 42 (1)(b) and (c)’s reference to the Senate’s powers 
and members and the claim that all other references to the Senate in Part V would be ‘spent’ 
upon abolition.126   
There was precedent for the government’s argument but the precedent in question is 
relatively old.  The government’s close textual analysis echoes the Judicial Committee of the 
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Privy Council’s comments in R v Nat Bell Liquors about the validity of Alberta’s Direct 
Legislation Act.127  In Nat Bell Liquors Alberta had to indirectly defend the constitutionality of 
its Direct Legislation Act which allowed for the electorate to petition for certain pieces of 
legislation.  As a result of this Act, Alberta had introduced prohibition legislation which, or so 
the argument went, was unconstitutional because it had not been enacted in accordance with the 
British North America Act.128  The problem with the Direct Legislation Act was that it seemed to 
‘alter[] the scheme of legislation laid down ... by the British North America Act.’129 In response 
to claims of invalidity the Privy Council observed that a ‘law is made by the provincial 
legislature when it has been passed in accordance with the regular procedure and has received 
the Royal Assent duly signified by the Lieutenant-Governor on behalf of His Majesty. Such was 
the case with the [Liquor] Act in question.’130  The argument of invalidity in Nat Bell Liquors 
centred on Alberta’s prohibition legislation not that of the Direct Legislation Act and the Privy 
Council expressly said that there was ‘no utility’ in investigating the latter Act’s 
constitutionality.131 The Privy Council ignored that, in substance, the Direct Legislation Act 
altered the legislative scheme, even if the exact wording did not ‘formally’ interfere with ‘the 
discharge of the functions of the legislature.’132 
Where the Senate Reference and Nat Bell Liquors differ is in their approach to 
constitutional interpretation.  Nat Bell Liquors pre-dates the famous “living tree doctrine” which 
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emerged in the Persons Case in 1930,133 and clearly relies on a close textual interpretation of the 
constitution rather than the broad and purposive approach adopted by the Supreme Court in the 
Senate Reference.134  Alberta’s experiment with direct legislation may not have changed the 
wording of the constitution or altered the procedure through which an Act was passed – it did not 
force the provincial government to pass legislation – but it did alter the role of the legislature 
with respect to legislation introduced under the Act.  It was this potential to alter the role of the 
Senate which led the Supreme Court to rule that the introduction of consultative Senate elections 
could only be done under the general amending procedure. Such elections would make the 
Senate answerable to the popular will in a way which was contrary to Canada’s constitutional 
design.135 
Not only did the Court criticize the government for valuing form over substance, they 
also accused the government of attempting to make section 44 the default amending formula. 136  
The latter accusation arose in the analysis of whether or not Parliament could unilaterally alter 
senatorial tenure.  The Court may have agreed that tenure was not included in the language of 
section 42 but they did not think that meant Parliament could unilaterally change senatorial 
tenure.  The Court held that section 44 has a limited scope but support for this holding is not 
found in the text of the relevant section or in Part V but in the debates and commentary 
surrounding the introduction of Part V.137  The Court also referenced the role of the Senate to 
further bolster the idea that the reform of tenure needs provincial consent.  
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 The problem with the Court’s reasoning is that the text of section 44 does not make it 
clear that it is as limited as the Court found it to be.  The Court could have argued that section 44 
has to be read with section 38 because the latter explicitly states that it is the ‘general procedure’ 
while the former only limits itself with respect to sections 41 and 42.  For obvious reasons there 
cannot be two general procedures, but even this argument does not explain why section 44 is as 
limited as the Court said.  While it might be an accepted form of legislative interpretation to look 
to Parliamentary debates and position papers, the Constitution Act 1982 is fundamentally 
different from an ordinary statute and errors of judicial interpretation are not so easily 
corrected.138 The Court’s comments about the limited nature of section 44 make more sense if 
that section is considered to be an adapted version of the old federal power under section 
91(1).139 Section 44 is not a direct continuation of section 91(1), however. The Court’s 
comments about the latter section in the Upper House Reference made it clear that it was limited 
to one statute, while section 44 includes the entirety of the Constitution of Canada, though 
changes are limited to executive government, the House of Commons, and the Senate.   
The problem with the argument that section 44 is a modified continuation of section 
91(1) is that it was meant to be a complete replacement.140 The Court describes sections 44 and 
45 as ‘fulfill[ing] the same basic function as ss91(1) and 92(1)’ and cites to explanatory note 7 of 
the April 1981 proposal in support of this claim.141 The Court does not actually reproduce the 
note in the text of its decision but for the purposes of clarity, I do so here:  
This provision allows Parliament, acting alone, to amend those parts of the Constitution 
of Canada that relate solely to the operation of the executive government of Canada at the 
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federal level or to the Senate or House of Commons.  Some aspects of certain institutions 
important for maintaining the federal-provincial balance, such as the Senate and the 
Supreme Court, are excluded from this provision and are covered in section 9 and 10.  
This provision is intended to replace section 91(1) of the B.N.A. Act. 142 
In short, note 7 makes it clear that section 44 was meant to replace section 91(1), not maintain it. 
The other reason the Court’s comments about section 44 ring false is that the wording of section 
44 did not change in any material way between the proposed Constitution Act, 1980 and the 
Constitution Act, 1982.143  If the provinces had wanted to limit the federal parliament’s power of 
unilateral amendment, they could have added more restrictive language into section 44.  Instead, 
the April Accord of 1981 reproduces, with only minor changes, the wording used by the federal 
government in their 1980 proposal. 
The federal government had more success with their arguments about Parliament’s power 
to amend Senators’ property and net worth requirements.  The Court largely agreed that such 
changes could be done under section 44 because such changes did not affect the Senate’s 
‘fundamental nature and role.’144  The only caveat the Court added was that Quebec would have 
to agree to the abolition of the property requirement given that Senatorial qualifications are 
different for Senators from Quebec.145   
What is perhaps most notable about the Senate Reference is the Court’s definition of a 
constitutional amendment: 
The concept of an “amendment to the Constitution of Canada”, within the meaning of 
Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, is informed by the nature of the Constitution and its 
rules of interpretation. As discussed, the Constitution should not be viewed as a mere 
collection of discrete textual provisions. It has an architecture, a basic structure. By 
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extension, amendments to the Constitution are not confined to textual changes. They 
include changes to the Constitution’s architecture. 146 
With such an understanding of the ‘Constitution of Canada’ it is clear that changes to the 
‘constitutional structure’ as well as actual alterations to the text of the Constitution (whatever 
might be included in that text) will be amendments under Part V.147 While such comments could 
be read as a warning to any government against attempting to alter the constitution without 
following the appropriate procedure, the question remains: where are we to find information 
about the ‘structure’ and ‘architecture’ of the Constitution if not the text of the Constitution 
itself?  Furthermore, if everything architectural is part of the constitution and all parts of the 
constitution are supreme law, just how much supreme law does Canada have?   
The Court seemed to answer the first question, at least in part, by looking at the text of 
the amending formulae itself and extrapolating from that text.  In other words, the Court looked 
to the amending formulae to figure out what is and is not in the Constitution. As the Court put it, 
‘[t]he words employed in Part V are guides to identifying the aspects of our system of 
government that form part of the protected content of the Constitution.’148 Such comments are, 
however, counter-intuitive given that Part V is not meant to be a guide to what is and is not part 
of the constitution.  Rather, Part V’s purpose is to single out the matters which are not covered 
by the general amending procedure. The Court blurs the two functions of the meta-constitution 
together and in so doing highlights the confusing nature of Canada’s meta-constitution.  
Admittedly the circular nature of section 52 is not much help in determining what is and is not 
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constitutional but the Court’s reliance on Part V results in there being constitutional topics rather 
than readily identifiable provisions. 
 With respect to the various procedures in Part V, the Court’s comments about section 41 
are worth a closer look.  The Court describes the matters outlined in section 41 as ‘fundamental’ 
and ‘essential to the survival of the state.’149 Such comments seem like an over-statement and 
are, to some extent historical revisionism.  It does seem somewhat bizarre to say that a province 
having fewer MPs than Senators is fundamental to anything other than the support of several 
smaller provinces; 150 but, perhaps ensuring such representation is a key part of the Canadian 
federal bargain.151  Certainly, it was the price of getting the support of such provinces in 1981.  
More importantly, such comments about ‘fundamental’ matters do suggest a criterion for 
assessing what matters will be considered part of the Constitution and thus supreme law. 
Presumably this idea of fundamental matters is somehow linked to the Court’s comments about 
constitutional architecture. The question then becomes would certain changes in political 
practice, such as the Prime Minister convening an advisory group before appointing the 
Governor General, be a change to the constitutional architecture?  Such a change would arguably 
be caught by section 41(a)’s reference to the ‘office’ of the Governor General, doubly so given 
that the Court understood senatorial elections as a change which could only be made under 
section 38 as such elections fell under section 42(1)(b)’s reference to method of selection. 
The Court’s reliance on the amending formula to help identify the scope of the 
constitution suggests that the Constitution of Canada consists of important topics instead of 
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special rules.  As such Part V functions as both an amending section and a recognition section. 
When the Senate Reference and the Supreme Court Reference are read together they point to the 
complexity of the amending formula and the idea that section 52(2) is not a closed list. Put more 
simply, if the Constitution is as broad as the Senate Reference implies and can, as the Supreme 
Court Reference along with the earlier cases suggest, include statutes (or at least certain sections 
thereof) not explicitly mentioned in the schedule, is it not possible that there have been a range of 
purported amendments which are constitutionally invalid because they have failed to follow the 
procedures set out in Part V?152   
 
4. The Implications 
In this section I examine the implications of the 2014 decisions for Canada’s meta-constitution as 
well as teasing out some lessons for constitutional design in a broader sense. 
 
A. What’s Next for Canada’s Meta-Constitution? 
The exact shape that Canada’s amending formula would take proved to be a key issue in the 
1981 negotiations, yet these negotiations did not deliver a clear and easily understandable set of 
ways to amend the Constitution.  The confusion inherent in the formulae, with their failure to 
clearly delineate the full range of limits to each method, is further compounded by the fact that it 
is not clear which documents, statutes, or parts of statutes are to be considered part of the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the matter has added another layer of 
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complexity by referring to various unwritten commitments which are considered part of the 
Constitution.  Consequently, it seems as though Part V as well as section 52 offer ways to 
discover what principles and laws are included in the Constitution.  In this sub-section I explore 
some potential ways to resolve the issues with Canada’s meta-constitution. 
 The obvious answer to the question of what’s next for the Constitution of Canada is a 
series of reference questions, either piecemeal or as one large reference.  Admittedly, reference 
questions, particularly those like the Senate Reference and the Supreme Court Reference, put the 
Court in a difficult position. The question of what the Constitution is, what additional statutes 
does it contain, is an uncomfortable mix of the legal and the political.153  The Court may well 
wish to avoid politics or to avoid commenting on proposed policies and have good reasons for so 
doing.  As the majority discussed in the Supreme Court Reference, it is vital that all parts of 
Canada have confidence in the Court’s ability to do its job well. Undue interference in politics 
would be just as damaging to the Court’s reputation as a lack of legal expertise.  Nonetheless, a 
series of reference questions could only come about as the result of political will.  The existence 
of the reference question procedure and its continued use suggests a large degree of deference 
towards the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, as the legitimate interpreters of the 
Constitution. Arguably it makes the Supreme Court of Canada the final arbiter of what it and is 
not constitutional both in the sense of adhering to the texts of the constitution and being part of 
the Constitution and thus supreme law.154 
The Senate Reference and the Supreme Court Reference point to the difficulties of 
drafting a constitution over a century after a country’s founding.  The Supreme Court’s latest 
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comments suggest that certain constitutional conventions, if they are significantly architectural, 
may have the status of supreme law.  In addition, the Court’s comments also suggest that if a 
piece of legislation is about a constitutional topic but has not followed the appropriate 
amendment procedure, then it is invalid.  One likely example of a now unconstitutional statute is 
the regional vetoes statute.155  This Act purports to prevent any government minister from 
introducing a constitutional amendment under section 38 or 41 until two thirds of the provinces 
have assented.  It also seems to make it so that the House of Commons could not propose an 
amendment without such provincial approval. Given that this Act legislates on the topic of 
amendment without unanimity (as required by section 41(e)) it is probably no longer valid.156 
Yet the Federal Court case of Conacher seems to suggest that statutes like the Regional 
Vetoes Act would not be struck down as ultra vires but would simply be unenforced.  Conacher 
was an application for judicial review of Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s decision to advise the 
Governor General to dissolve Parliament and set an election date of October 14, 2008.157  Duff 
Conacher attempted to argue that this violated section 56.1 of the Canada Elections Act which 
reads: 
(1) Nothing in this section affects the powers of the Governor General, including the 
power to dissolve Parliament at the Governor General’s discretion. 
(2) Subject to subsection (1), each general election must be held on the third Monday of 
October in the fourth calendar year following polling day for the last general election, 
with the first general election after this section comes into force being held on Monday, 
October 19, 2009.158 
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In response to Conacher, the government argued that section 56.1 ‘was never intended to be 
legally binding.’159 The government rooted its argument about section 56.1’s supposed 
unenforceability in the fact that, if it was meant to be enforced, it had the potential to alter the 
Office of the Governor General and such changes would need a constitutional amendment.160  
Instead, the government argued that section 56.1 created a ‘statutory expectation’ of an election 
every four years.161 The term ‘statutory expectation’ is a contradiction in terms as most people 
expect that laws will be enforced, not that they are mere guidelines which a government may 
ignore at will.  If a government wishes to ignore a law, said law should be repealed or amended. 
The Federal Court sidestepped the section 56.1 issue and held that Conacher was asking the court 
to intervene in political issues, thus section 56.1 remains on the statute books but appears to be 
unenforceable. Neither the Federal Court nor the Federal Court of Appeal explicitly adopted the 
government’s argument that section 56.1 created a ‘statutory expectation’ or what exactly the 
effect of such an expectation would be.  It may be that such statutory expectations could 
crystallize into conventions after several decades or so but that would still leave them as 
unenforceable, at least in the courts.  
The government’s argument in Conacher with respect to section 56.1 of the Canada 
Elections Act seems a little far-fetched. Leaving aside the issue of a specified date which does 
seem to alter the Office of the Governor-General, it could be argued that section 56.1 falls within 
the ambit of section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982 because it deals with matters relating to the 
House of Commons and executive government. The more pressing question with section 56.1 of 
the Canada Elections Act is whether by creating a new maximum term for Parliament, it amends 
                                                 
159 Conacher FC, (n 157) [52]. 
160 ibid [51]. 
161 ibid [52], [55]. 
48 
 
or contradicts section 4 of the Charter which limits the terms of legislative bodies to five 
years.162 The Charter, as a whole, is not one of the matters listed in sections 41 and 42 and so 
certain parts of it could be amended by mere legislation under section 44. In which case, does 
section 56.1 amend section 4(1) of the Charter and possibly also section 4(2) of the Charter?  
Perhaps due to the role the Governor General plays in dissolving Parliament, changes to section 
4 of the Charter will need to be done under section 41.  In the alternative, those Charter sections 
which are not caught by sections 41 or 43 may need to be amended under section 38 even if they 
seem to apply only to the matters listed in section 44.  In which case, there is room for an 
argument that because section 56.1 does not extend the maximum term of a Parliament it is valid 
legislation.163 Again, however, the problem becomes that even if section 56.1 is a valid 
legislative amendment, can it be enforced in the face of the Charter’s limit of five years?  
Probably not.  The Charter is supreme law and will trump section 56.1.   
Perhaps like the Regional Vetoes Act, section 56.1, is a convention-in-waiting, an 
emergent part of the unenforceable political constitution.  This does, of course, lead to a 
potentially bizarre situation whereby, following the logic of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, 
parts of what was the unenforceable, unwritten, political aspects of the constitution are now part 
of the legal and thus enforceable constitution, while actual laws are unenforceable because they 
purport to create new conventions, or could lead to a new convention in future.  The Supreme 
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Court has previously stated that courts enforce law but not conventions yet since 1982 that line 
appears to have blurred in two ways.  First, the logic of section 52 turned certain conventions 
into enforceable law, provided such conventions are part of the constitutional architecture; and, 
second, since 1982 governments have tried to create new conventions through statute.164  
The question raised by both the Regional Vetoes Act and section 56.1 of the Canada 
Elections Act is whether governments can strengthen the Constitution’s guarantees through 
legislation.  It seems obvious to say that no such guarantee could be weakened by legislation; for 
example, a government could not, outside a time of war, pass legislation saying that elections 
will be held every seven years.  So why would the answer be different if the guarantee is 
strengthened?165 Perhaps because a constitution’s guarantees tend to be baselines rather than 
aspirations, strengthening their guarantees is in keeping with the spirit of the constitution.  Yet, 
the question remains, can such legislative alterations be enforced in the face of an unaltered and 
contrary provision of the constitution? 
Absent a series of constitutional challenges, the first option for dealing with Canada’s 
meta-constitution is to leave it as it is and allow the Court to continue as it has done.  This is 
arguably the easiest option, though it does leave the Court open to accusations of over-stepping 
its role.  After all, the Court’s role is to ensure that all laws are passed in accordance with the 
Constitution which is a question of interpretation.  It is not the Court’s role to say what the 
Constitution is, only what it means.  Yet, in Canada, the former question is unclear making 
constitutional interpretation difficult.  Such an approach could also make the Court the target of 
                                                 
164 Hawkins refers to such endeavours as ‘constitutional workarounds’ and notes that they can include motions of the 
House as well as statutes, Hawkins (n 10). 
165 Dawood notes that the Court rejected reforms which would have enhanced democracy thus it is arguable that 
there is little difference between strengthening and weakening guarantees, see Dawood, (n 14) 740. 
50 
 
reformist ire because of the chilling effect on democratic reform.166  In addition, leaving the 
Court to continue as it has done leaves important questions unanswered.  There is room for 
individuals to bring challenges before the courts, as in Conacher and as in Aniz Alani’s attempt 
to force the federal government to appoint Senators.167  As useful as such challenges might be 
they tend to be decided on technicalities, leaving the bigger, foundational questions unanswered. 
The Court may not have explicitly suggested that another round of constitutional 
negotiations is needed but its caution with respect to amendments may well force the issue.  
Certainly, if the Senate is to be abolished or significantly amended, the need for unanimity, or at 
least widespread consensus,168 likely means another constitutional conference is needed in order 
to properly canvass the interests and wishes of all parties.  Of course, the idea of re-opening the 
constitutional debate may not be a popular one and there is no guarantee that another round of 
constitutional negotiations would be any more successful than the last two attempts at reform. 
What the Court could do is clarify the legal effect of section 44. The scope of section 44 
is now clear, following the Senate Reference and the Supreme Court Reference it seems likely 
that Part V means that Parliament cannot pass legislation on constitutional topics unless the 
proposed changes are minimal and in no way fall under section 41 or 42 or engage provincial 
interests.  In this way section 44 appears to allow something like the ‘housekeeping’ that the 
Supreme Court referred to in the Upper House Reference.169  What is less clear is what needs to 
                                                 
166 Arguably there is already some anger at the Court for its role here, Hawkins (n 10) 514.  See also, Dawood (n 14) 
739-40, 750 (noting that the Senate Reference has limited the potential for reform). 
167 http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/stephen-harper-s-unappointed-senate-seats-unconstitutional-
vancouver-lawyer-says-1.2873629 See also, Alani v Canada (Prime Minister), 2015 FC 649 aff’d Canada (Prime 
Minister v Alani, 2016 FCA 22.   
168 In theory much Senate reform could be achieved under section 38 but if the federal government opts to follow the 
Regional Vetoes Act, the threshold for consensus becomes much higher, see, Andrew Heard and Tim Swartz, ‘The 
Regional Veto Formula and its Effects on Canada’s Constitutional Amendment Process’ (1997) 30:2 Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 339. 
169 Upper House Reference, (n 39) 65. 
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be done to make amendments under section 44 – do any purported amendments need to invoke 
section 44 to be valid supreme law?  To use an example from the provincial context, does a 
human rights statute have to invoke section 45 to gain supremacy over other laws, or is it enough 
for the Act to simply say all statutes should be construed in accordance with it?  Is it the case that 
any federal legislation dealing with the matters listed in section 44 is supreme law? If we take 
Walters’ argument seriously and agree that it would be absurd for law to be supreme without 
saying so, then numerous acts may need to be re-enacted to confer explicitly their section 44 
supreme status.  Leaving aside the observation that the Supreme Court Reference has made 
sections of a statute supreme law, re-enacting acts to make them explicitly supreme might be 
useful in clarifying the extent of Canada’s Constitution, but it would also result in numerous 
interpretive issues.  After all, following the logic of New Brunswick Broadcasting, no part of the 
Constitution can abrogate another part.  So how could any court reconcile the various parts of the 
supreme law?  
With respect to the interpretive issues, there is a strain of thought which tacitly divides 
the Canadian Constitution into ordinary law and supreme law, with the latter sometimes referred 
to as entrenched.170  According to the logic of the amending formula, some parts of the 
Constitution are more entrenched than others.  That much is beyond question, but there are those 
who argue that only the entrenched parts are supreme, or even that it is only the entrenched parts 
that are the Constitution.171  This is textually implausible given that section 52 refers to the entire 
                                                 
170 Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32 (Factum of the Amicus Curiae [31], [35], [43] and [11 n 47]). See 
also, Glover, ‘Structure, Substance’ (n 14) 247-248 Schneiderman (n 14) 224.  At times, Newman seems to question 
the idea that supreme law has to be entrenched but at other times he seems to accept it, Newman ‘Defining the 
“Constitution of Canada”’ (n 18) 432-434, 479; Warren J Newman, ‘Putting One’s Faith in a Higher Power: 
Supreme Law, the Senate Reform Reference, Legislative Authority and the Amending Procedures’ (2015) 34 
National Journal of Constitutional Law 99, 105. 
171 Schneiderman argues that because section 44 amendments are done through ordinary law they are not entrenched 
and so not part of the Constitution, Scheiderman, (n 14) 224 
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Constitution of Canada as ‘supreme law’ and would result in different provisions of the 
constitution trumping others.  Such trumping would be in direct contradiction to the majority’s 
comment in New Brunswick Broadcasting – no part of the constitution can abrogate another.  
Different degrees of entrenchment make some parts harder to change than others but it does not 
render any part of the Constitution less than supreme.  In short, the interpretation issues remain 
even with the ordinary versus entrenched parts of the Constitution argument.  
Another potential way around the issues posed by section 44 and section 52 is the 
proclamation versus law distinction.172 Sections 38, 41, 43 require amendments to be made by 
‘proclamation’ whereas sections 44 and 45 allow the respective legislatures to make laws 
amending the constitution.  As section 52 states any law incompatible with ‘the provisions of the 
Constitution’ is invalid this might allow amendments made under section 44 to be subject to the 
rest of the Constitution. However, the use of proclamations may just be a way of ensuring that 
amendments under sections 38, 41, and 43 are made public; that such amendments must 
explicitly state they are amendments.  The proclamation-law distinction is just another version of 
the entrenched-as-supreme fallacy.  The proclamation-law distinction may have made sense for 
1980’s proposed constitution where the supremacy clause and the definitional clause were 
separate but that is not the case for the Constitution Act 1982.  Consequently, the need to figure 
out exactly how section 44 operates is urgent. 
 
B. Broader Implications  
                                                 
172 Schneiderman uses this distinction as well, ibid. 
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The current version of Canada’s meta-constitution emerged not with the country’s founding but 
over a century later.  It may be the case that the issues found in Canada’s meta-constitution result 
from its ex-post-facto creation but it still contains a number of other lessons, both theoretical and 
practical. With respect to the former, Canada’s experience highlights the role that the meta-
constitution plays and how amending sections must be read with definitional sections in order to 
understand what the constitution is.  The uncertainty over the extent of Canada’s supreme law 
and the question of how to figure out what is and is not part of the constitution results from both 
the wording of Canada’s meta-constitution and from judicial interpretation of it.  The Supreme 
Court has attempted to impose coherence on the written parts of the constitution by extrapolating 
principles and features and using these to construct a “constitutional architecture.”  Such moves 
tacitly invoke the broader, original meaning of constitution, ‘the whole of the body politic, 
including values, norms, behaviours, and institutions.’173    
 The Supreme Court of Canada’s reference to constitutional architecture calls to mind the 
basic structure doctrine which has been seen in both India and Belize.174 The Supreme Courts of 
both countries have used the basic structure argument to limit what is, on paper, an unlimited 
legislative power to amend the constitution.175  In Belize, the Supreme Court used the values 
referenced in the preamble to the constitution to impose limits on the legislature’s amending 
power.176  While in India, the Supreme Court will recognize only those legislative amendments 
                                                 
173 Berger (n 7) 250. 
174 Albert, ‘Theory and Doctrine’ (n 98) 13-14. 
175 ibid. 
176 Bowen v Belize (AG) (2009), Claim No 445 of 2008 (SC)[134], available at: 
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Vellos et al, [2010] UKPC 7 [1]-[31]. 
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which do not alter the ‘basic foundation and structure of the Constitution.’177  Albert notes that 
the Indian Constitution does not explain what this foundation and structure is but he argues that 
constitutional amendment rules can express constitutional values, particularly in countries like 
India and Canada which have a hierarchy of amending rules.178  He also notes that such 
hierarchies of amendment procedure can be motivated by ‘political bargaining’ among other 
things.179  He did not, however, examine the amendment formulae with the definitional sections 
but, in both Belize and India, the courts are relying on ideas implicit in the main constitutional 
text to limit changes to that text by legislation alone.  
The idea of basic structure or architecture of a constitution is, then, a counter-majoritarian 
limit on elected representatives.  As such, the meta-constitution, or more properly, judicial 
interpretation of the meta-constitution can enhance judicial power to determine what is and is not 
constitutional.  In so doing, courts ensure that they cannot be readily abolished or have their 
power limited through unilateral legislative action, and that the broader shape of the body politic 
will be similarly protected. As such the meta-constitution can be used to enhance political 
stability, even if it is at the expense of being certain about what features or statutory provisions 
will be considered constitutional and thus supreme law. 
 
5. Conclusion 
                                                 
177 Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v Kerala 1973 4 SCR 225 (Supreme Court of India) [316], available at 
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The recent Senate Reference and Supreme Court Reference highlight the difficulties facing a 
country with an unclear meta-constitution.  The Supreme Court of Canada has opted to play it 
safe and, whether it realizes it or not, may have greatly expanded what exactly is considered part 
of the Constitution.  Ultimately the legal questions raised by Canada’s meta-constitution are 
political questions: what rules and architecture are sufficiently fundamental to be part of the 
Constitution and how can political reform be achieved when the scope of the constitution is 
unclear?   
The issues with Canada’s meta-constitution point to a further problem with modern 
constitutional democracies: the role of unwritten constitutions and the broader meaning of 
constitution.  At times, the judicial comments about Canada’s unwritten constitution invoke the 
broader, original meaning of constitution,180 and it may be that the Supreme Court’s approach to 
Canada’s meta-constitution offers one way to reconcile the modern meaning of constitution with 
its broader meaning.  By using Canada’s meta-constitution to identify constitutional topics, 
however, the Court undermines the certainty of the constitutional text while securing the 
continuity of the unwritten commitments and the “historical lineage” of the broader constitution. 
I have argued that a crucial, yet often overlooked part of a written constitution is the 
meta-constitution.  The meta-constitution sets out what the constitution actually is and how it can 
be amended. Without such information countries run the risk of constitutional gridlock or 
constitutional crises. Courts may well be able to come up with rules of interpretation which can 
forestall gridlock or crises in countries where the meta-constitution is unclear.  Yet such judicial 
actions can only ever be a sticking plaster and run the risk of being de facto constitutional 
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amendments in and of themselves.  The Canadian example suggests that framers of constitutional 
texts should be aware of how these texts, particularly if they are to be entrenched, affect the 
unwritten portions of the constitution and of how this could inadvertently expand the scope of 
what becomes an enforceable part of the constitution. 
 
